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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Troy's defenses raised on the same notes

and transactions sued on by the Bank should have been dismissed
on summary judgment, pursuant to the four-year statute of
limitations (78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 as amended), based upon the
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., 1953 as amended,
2.

Whether Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same

notes and transactions sued on by the Bank, should have been
dismissed on summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of
limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
3.

Whether the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims, alleged

to have occurred in November of 1988, well into the four-year
limitation period, was appropriate on summary judgment based upon
the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as
amended•
4.

Whether there were genuine issues of material fact with

respect to Troy's Counterclaims remaining after the court's
ruling on the statutes of limitation issues (limited to Counts
Five and Six as relating to the November 1988 loan) to preclude
summary judgment being entered on those claims.
These issues were all ruled on in summary judgment,
therefore, the standard of review is de novo.

The appellate

court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial
court.

Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).

The

appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the

1

losing party below, (Troy) in determining whether those facts
require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the
prevailing party below*

The appellate court is to give no

deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are
reviewed for correctness.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 119

P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the case and course of proceeding has already
been set forth by Troy in its opening brief ("Appellant's
Brief").

Troy however, wishes to emphasize the fact that the

issues in this case (certainly Troy's Counterclaims and defenses)
involve the continuing relationship Troy had with the Bank,
commencing in 1985 and continuing up until the time this law suit
was filed.
The Bank in its Memorandum ("Respondent's Brief") has tried
to separate everything into three distinct time periods.
However, the actions of the Bank, including its attempts to
remedy the problems it created in the initial loan, were
continuous and on-going.

It has been admitted by the Bank that

it did not have the funds for Troy upon SBA approval of the
initial loan and that the Bank tried to remedy this problem as
quickly as possible.

(See Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts

6, 7 & 8 ) . The Bank made the subsequent loans to remedy the
problems created by the Bank.

(See Respondent's Brief, Statement

of Fact No. 10).
2

Troy contends, and has maintained from the beginning, that
its financial problems originated from the problems with the
initial loan. After that time the matter became the Bank's
problem.

The Bank has acknowledged this and has attempted in a

number of ways to remedy the problems created over a period of
years, including the 1987 and 1988 loans. These attempts however
did not remedy the problem.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Troy's defenses raised on the same notes and

transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed
on summary judgment pursuant to the four-year statute of
limitations (78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) based upon the
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
a.

A statute of limitation as a general rule is not a bar

to asserting a claim as a defense. The Troy Defendants are
entitled to their claims to the extent of the amount claimed by
the Bank regardless of the statute of limitations period.
b.

The second sentence of 78-12-44 pertains to the effect

of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay as addressed in the
first sentence and the heading of the statute.

It was not

intended to change or circumvent the long-standing rule that
defenses are not barred by the statute of limitations.
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2.

Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same notes and

transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed
based upon the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25 U.C.A*
1953 as amended.
a.

The Counterclaims are based upon loan transactions for

which there is a sufficient writing for the six-year limitation
period to be applied. 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
b.

The Counterclaims are based upon transactions and a

relationship with the Bank which continued through November of
1988 and thereafter up until the time of the law suit.

The

Bank's actions occurred well within the four-year limitation
period.
3.

There are genuine issues of material fact relating to

Troy's claims, not barred by the statute of limitations (limited
to Counts Five and Six relating to the 1988 loan) but dismissed
on summary judgment, to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
a.

There are material issues of fact concerning the

Bank's relationship to the Troy Defendants at the time of the
1988 loan.
b.

There are material issues of fact regarding the

Bank's actions with respect to the 1988 loan.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENSES RAISED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The Bank argues in its Brief that the Troy defendants never
properly asserted its claims as affirmative defenses.

This is

simply not the case and the Bank should be estopped from making
such an argument at this time.
The defendants properly raised as defenses the Bank's
failure to properly release and disburse the loan proceeds in
breach of the agreed terms (Fifth Defense); the defendants did
not receive proper disbursement of the funds (Seventh Defense);
the Bank breached fiduciary duties (Eighth Defense) and the Bank
failed to deal in good faith and with fair dealing (Eleventh
Defense).

These defenses were properly raised and the Bank was

put on fair notice regarding these issues, including the improper
disbursement of the loans.

In fact, it was the disbursement of

one of these loans, the later 1987 loan, that finally went to
trial.

The Bank cannot claim at this time that it didn't have

proper notice of these claims.
A.
Troy's Claims Cannot be Barred Because of both the
Statute of Limitations and the Failure to Establish a Prima Facie
Case.
The Bank claims that Troy's claims should be dismissed
because of (1) the statute of limitations; and (2) because of
Troy's failure to establish a prima facie case. This argument by
the Bank brings forth the purpose of this appeal. Troy never had
5

the opportunity to establish its prima facie case or have its
claims heard on the merits by the trial court because of the
trial court's initial ruling barring Troy's claims based on the
statute of limitations.
At the summary judgment hearing the court first asked
counsel to address the statute of limitations issue anticipating
that the court's ruling may limit any further discussion on the
other issues of the case. The court was correct in its
assumption.

After ruling on the statute of limitations issue,

which barred Troy's claims and defenses, Troy was never given the
opportunity to proceed on its claims and defenses. The defenses
should not have been dismissed based on the statute of
limitations.

Troy should have been given the opportunity to

present the facts on its claims and defenses.
B.
The Statute of Limitations do not apply to Defenses
Raised to the Principal Action.
As previously cited in Troy's Opening Brief, the statute of
limitations do not apply to defenses raised by a party.

The Bank

has conceded this, but then has attempted to distinguish this
case from the general rule.

However, this rule is applicable to

the facts in this case. A recent case squarely on point is
Seattle First National Bank v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252, review
denied, 833 P.2d 386 (Wash.App. 1992)(Exhibit "J" to Opening
Brief).

The Bank attempts to distinguish this case by claiming

that Troy failed to raise its claims as a defense.
6

This however,

as set forth above, is simply not the case.

Improper release and

disbursement of loan proceeds were raised by Troy as claims and
defenses.
Next, the Bank tries to distinguish Siebol by claiming that
the trial court in Siebol found substantial evidence to support
an offset based on the principles of promissory estoppel. This,
however, should not be a distinguishing factor, as set forth
above, the trial court in this case, after its preliminary ruling
on the statute of limitations issue, precluded Troy from
proceeding to establish its prima facie case for promissory
estoppel (Troy's Third Claim was Promissory Estoppel) or any of
its other claims or defenses.
The Bank's continuing claim that there was no evidence
presented to the trial court on Troy's claims or defenses is a
misnomer and should not be determinative.

Troy was precluded

from doing so by the trial court after its initial ruling on the
statute of limitations issue; therefore, this evidence was never
heard or presented to the trial court, mandating that this appeal
be filed.

The Bank should not be able to bootstrap this argument

and have the appeal denied because of Troy's failure to present
evidence to support its case at trial, when it was precluded from
doing so by the trial court's own ruling which is being appealed.
The Siebol case is not distinguishable from this case.
court should have allowed the defenses to remain.
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The trial

Although Siebol is a Washington State case, Troy has cited
Utah cases, Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985)
(Exhibit "K" to Appellant's Brief), with holdings consistent with
Siebol.

The Utah Supreme Court in Jacobsen held that even though

the defendants' counterclaim was barred by the statute of
limitations, defendants were still entitled to a defense up to
the amount of the note and the defenses were not dismissed based
on the saute of limitations.

Troy should at least be entitled to

its counterclaims and defenses up to the amount being sought
against it in the suit.
Troy's alleged claims relate to the period of time during
the Bank's relationship with the defendants.

This commenced in

1985 and continued through to the time the law suit was filed.
Troy's claims are certainly coexisting and overlapping in time
with the Bank's claims.

The statement that there was no default

under the loan until February of 1990 is not totally accurate.
There were problems with the loan before this time and it has
been admitted by all parties that the subsequent loans were made
to try to remedy the problems created by the Bank's problems in
funding the initial loan.
The Bank has failed to distinguish Jacobsen and has failed
to cite any Utah case law as to why Jacobsen should not be
followed in this case.

This court should follow the Utah Supreme

Court's holding in Jacobsen and remand the case back to the trial
court with Troy's defenses and claims intact.
8

C.
Troy was Never Given the Opportunity to Establish its
Prima Facie Case on its Defenses due to the Trial Court's Initial
Ruling barring the Defenses based on the Statute of Limitations.
As stated above, the Bank's continuing claim that there was
no evidence presented to the trial court on Troy's claims or
defenses is a misnomer and should not be considered in this case.
Troy was precluded from doing so by the trial court after its
initial ruling on the statute of limitations issue. Therefore,
Troy never received the opportunity to have this evidence heard
mandating that this appeal be filed.

The Bank should not be able

to bootstrap this argument and have the appeal denied because of
Troy's failure to present evidence to support its case at trial,
when it was precluded from doing so by the trial court's own
ruling which Troy is appealing.
D.
The Trial Court's Interpretation and Application of the
Second Sentence of Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, is too
Broad and in Error.
The Bank without citing any authority in support of its
position claims that 78-12-44, U.C.A. creates a complete bar to a
party raising a defense to any action when it would be barred by
any statute.

This interpretation too broad and is not consistent

with established Utah case law, previously cited, the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; the general rule that the statute of
limitations do not bar defenses; and also the general rules of
construction and interpretation of statutes.
In Jacobsen the Utah Supreme Court could have easily dealt
with the issue by holding that the defenses were barred pursuant
9

to Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., rather than doing so, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the defenses were available although they
would have been barred by the statute of limitations.

If the

trial court's interpretation of 78-12-44 U.C.A. is left to stand
it will be in direct conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's
ruling in Jacobsen,
The Bank's attempt to distinguish Jacobsen by claiming that
the Court relied on Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
is not enough to reconcile the trial court's ruling in this case
with the Supreme Court's holding in Jacobsen.

The Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure are not statutory law, therefore, given the trial
court's broad interpretation of the second sentence of 78-12-44
U.C.A. in this case, the defenses allowed under Rule 13, must
also be barred.
Furthermore, Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allows claims after the limitation period based on the Utah
Supreme Court's ruling, would be in direct violation of 78-12-44
U.C.A., according to the trial court's interpretation and
application of 78-12-44 U.C.A. in this case.
The reasonable interpretation of the second sentence of 7812-44 U.C.A, in light of the above, is that it is intended for
cases dealing with the effect of acknowledgment or part payment
on the tolling of the statute of limitations, as addressed in the
heading and first sentence of the statute.

The second sentence

should not be pulled out of context and applied to all possible
10

situations.

This would totally circumvent the general rule

regarding defenses, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and would
be in direct contradiction with the Utah Supreme Court's rulings
on the issue.
The trial court erred in isolating and then applying the
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. to this case. This
sentence has never been given such a wide interpretation as to
replace or supersede the general rule or principle that the
statutes of limitation do not apply to defenses. And the Bank
has failed to cite any case law in Utah or else where in support
of this position.
The fact that defenses are not subject to the statutes of
limitation continues to be the general rule, and continues to be
the general rule in the State of Utah.

Utah courts have so held

since 78-12-44 U.C.A was enacted in 1951. See Jacobsen v.
Bunker. supra. and other cases following this general rule which
have been cited in Troy's opening Brief.
II.

TROY'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Troy's Counterclaims were dismissed based on the four-year
limitation period.

These claims should not have been dismissed

based upon the four-year statute of limitations.

11

A.

There is a Sufficient Writing for the Six Year Provision

of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to Apply.
There is no question but that the loan documents, which the
Bank has sued to enforce are in writing.

However, the Bank

claims that there is not an exact written term regarding the
Bank's promise to have the funds available immediately upon SBA
approval.

(June 24, 1992 transcript pages 22-23).

However, it

is not necessary that the exact term sought to be enforced be in
writing for the six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to
apply; it can even be oral, as long as it relates to or grows out
of a written instrument.

Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 499 P.2d

273 (Utah 1972).
In Pickett Bros. Farms the actual obligation arose out of an
oral promise made to pay the plaintiff while the parties were
negotiating a written contract.

The Court found that the

obligation to pay and breach thereof arose out of the written
contract the parties later agreed to and the Court imposed the
six-year limitation period. Id. at 275. In this case, there is a
writing concerning the initial $325,000 loan.

The Bank agreed to

disburse the funds for the initial loan upon SBA approval. The
Bank however failed to do so and delayed in disbursing the funds
as provided for in the written loan instruments.

This failure or

breach relates to the written loan documents and thus falls
within the six-year statute of limitations provision.
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Even if

the Bank disputes these facts, all facts are to be construed in
favor of the opposing party on summary judgment.
B. Even if the Four-Year Limitation Period is Applied the
Allegations Contained in the Counterclaim Cover Actions Occurring
Within the Four-Year Period.
Even if the four-year limitation period is applied Troy's
Counterclaims are based upon numerous transactions and its ongoing relationship with the Bank which commenced in 1985 and
continued through November 1988 and thereafter.
of Facts Nos. 15-18)

(See Statement

Therefore, Troy's Counterclaim dealing with

the November 1988 loan should not have been dismissed by the
court on summary judgment based on the four-year limitation
period.
C. The Trial Court Never Heard or Ruled on the Merits of
the Counterclaim and the Defendants' were Never Given the
Opportunity to make their Prima Facie Case.
Troy adamantly denies the Bank's statement that the trial
court heard other evidence and argument on issues as to Troy's
Counterclaims, which were previously dismissed based on the
statute of limitations.

The trial court after dismissing the

Counterclaim based on the statute of limitations did not proceed
and hear the other grounds for dismissal. The court had no
reason to do so after its initial ruling on the statute of
limitations issue.
stages.

This is why the hearing was held in two

The statute of limitations issue was addressed first so

that the court would not have to hear further evidence or

13

argument on the Counterclaims dismissed based on the statute of
limitations argument.
In Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d
155 (Utah 1980) cited by the Bank, the grounds relied on to
sustain the courts decision had been argued, briefed, and
presented to the court at trial for adjudication.
certainly not what happened in this case.

This is

Furthermore in the

case Viehwev v. Thompson, 647 P.2d 311, (Idaho 1983) also cited
by the Bank, the appellate court found that the dismissal based
on the statute of limitation was harmless error because of the
trial court's finding on comparative negligence.

There was no

finding of fact on Troy's Counterclaims in this case, which were
dismissed based upon the statute of limitations.
The Bank on pages 15 through 31 of its Brief goes on with
argument concerning other grounds for dismissal of Troy's
Counterclaims which were never heard or ruled on by the trial
court at the summary judgment hearing.

Troy contends, as stated

above, that there was no ruling or findings of fact by the trial
court on these issues to properly raise these issues before this
court on appeal.

If the court does wish to consider these issues

Troy refers the court to its memoranda filed in relation to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Attached hereto as Exhibit "A").

The only Counterclaims the court did not dismiss based on
the statute of limitations are Count Five for Control and Self
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Dealing and Count Six for Breaches of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing.

These will be addressed below.
III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT RELATING
TO THE LIMITED CLAIMS NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BUT DISMISSED
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

There are genuine issues of material fact relating to the
limited claims not barred by the statute of limitations, but
dismissed on summary judgment. These limited claims are Count
Five for Control and Self-dealing and Count Six for Breaches of
Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
As set forth above, the Bank's relationship and action with
Troy was continuing and continued well into November of 1988.
The delay in funding the initial loan for $325,000 was only the
start of a continuing relationship, which evolved into a deeper
relationship, involving other loans and actions by the Bank,
giving rise to allegations of control and self-dealing and
breaches of good faith and fair dealing.

This was all subsequent

to September of 1985 and continued through November of 1988.
The Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was to resolve
the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the $60,000 loan
was not made until February 10, 1987. Again in November of 1988,
the Bank made loans to the defendants and materially changed the
terms of the original loan documents.
15, 16 & 17)

(Statement of Facts Nos.

This action occurred in November of 1988 and

certainly presents an issue of fact on the November 1988 loan in
15

relation to Troy's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Control and Selfdealing and Breaches of Good-faith and Fair dealing.

These

counts should not have been dismissed by the court on summary
judgment.
There is also an issue of fact as to whether a special or
fiduciary relationship was developed between the Bank and the
Troy Defendants.

Although a lender is generally not in a

fiduciary position, facts and circumstances often arise which
create a fiduciary relationship.

A fiduciary relationship does

arise when the banks become financial advisors.

This is

particularly true when there has been a relationship established
for a period of time, justifying the customer's reliance on the
Bank to act in his best interest.

Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank,

64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188
(Mont. 1984).

In the instant case, Troy relied on the Bank to

act in its best interest.

The Bank failed to properly disburse

funds to Troy and was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on
how to generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate
the problems created by the Bank.

The Bank is also a fiduciary

to Troy pursuant to statute, as the trustee on the deeds of trust
securing the loans in this case.

Section 22-1-1 et. seq. U.C.A.

1953 as amended.
The Bank also exercised control over the Troy which is
sufficient to raise issues of fact as to whether a fiduciary
relationship existed and is so whether it was breached.
16

A.G.

Jensen Farms Co. v. Carqill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
The Bank's control and dominance over Troy was so substantial
that Troy's operations and affairs in Utah rested totally in the
control of the Bank.

Troy is an out-of-state family run business

and relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise. This
was especially true since Troy ran into its problems as a result
of the Bank's failure to timely fund the initial loan. Troy
relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to remedy
the situation.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself
first from the proceeds of the November 1988 loan, contrary to
what was represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to
Troy.

This alone raises issues of fact concerning the Bank's

self dealing.

Rosenberqer v. Herbert, 232 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1967).

A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith and scrupulous
honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to made good faith
disclosures of all facts relevant to the transaction."

Kirbv v.

Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 1985); Meyers v. Moody, 693
F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).

The Bank breached its duty to

disclose all relevant information to Troy in this case and Troy's
claim for control and self dealing should not have been dismissed
on summary judgment.
Moreover, factual issues are present in this case invoking
the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.

Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.Rptr.
17

123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co,. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984).

For one, the parties were

in inherently unequal bargaining positions.

This is particularly

true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial funds, which
put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and subject to
the Bank's control.

Second, Troy was especially vulnerable

because of the harm it would suffer if the Bank refused to remedy
the situation as a result it had to place a great deal of trust
in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was aware of Troy's
vulnerability.
All of these factual issues are relevant concerning the
Bank's fiduciary duty to Troy and the breach of the Bank's duty
of good faith and fair dealing occurring on the November 1988
loan; therefore, the Bank's motion for summary judgment on these
claims should not have been granted.

Wallis v. Superior Court,

207 Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.. Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984).
IV.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS IN ERROR
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED SO THAT THE CASE
CAN BE HEARD ON THE MERITS WITH THE
DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES INTACT.

The trial court's ruling is in error.

The trial court

dismissed Troy's Counterclaims based on the four-year limitation
period when the six-year period should have been applied.

The

dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims is certainly material to Troy's
case and the dismissal unjustly prejudiced Troy by precluded Troy
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from proceeding any further with its defenses and claims against
the Bank.

This constitutes a material error.

Furthermore, the trial court erred in dismissing Troy's
defenses based on the statute of limitations. The law is clear
in Utah and other jurisdictions that the statute of limitations
do not bar a party from raising a defense to an action.
Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact present
relating to the claims not dismissed based on the statute of
limitation, therefore, these claims should not have been
dismissed on summary judgment.
The ruling of the trial court on these issues was in error
and should be reversed so the matter can be heard with Troy's
Counterclaims and defenses intact.
CONCLUSION
The defenses raised by Troy are not subject to the statutes
of limitation and should not have been dismissed on summary
judgment.

Troy's Counterclaim should not have been dismissed on

summary judgment.

The trial court's granting of summary judgment

on these issues should be reversed.
The Final Judgment, Decree and Order of Foreclosure entered
by the District Court should be set aside. The case should be
remanded back to the District Court for a trial on the merits
with Troy's defenses and Counterclaim intact.
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DATED this

ftj

day of March, 1994.
BROWN & BROWN, P.C.

•L

lO^*44L

ty. Call, Esq.
[ttorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EXHIBIT "A"

FILE COPY
•Charles C. Brown (1447)
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457)
Budge W. Call (5047)
BROWN & BROWN, F.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimants
505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 355-6800
Telefacsimile: (801) 531-7271

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS* MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL and JOHN DOES
1 through 10,
Case No. 900901153
Defendants.
Judge J. Philip Eves
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL,
Counterclaimants
vs.
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Counterclaim
Defendant.

The defendant Troy Hygro Systems, Inc.. and the remaining
above-named defendants
"Troy-

or

Memorandum

(hereafter referred to collectively as

-defendants")
in

Opposition

respectfully
to

submit

Plaintiff's

the

Motion

following

for Partial

Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, state Bank of Southern Utah (hereinafter "State
BankM

or

simply

-Bank") filed a Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment, seeking the dismissal of the defendants' Counterclaim/
which consists of seven claims for relief, as follows: (1) Breach
of Agreement to Fund, (2) Wilful Breach of Contract and Economic
Duress,

(3) Promissory Estoppel, (4) Negligent Structuring and

Disbursal, (5) Control and Self Dealing, (6) Breaches of Good
Faith

and Fair Dealing, and

(7) Accounting, Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief.
To prevail on its Motion the plaintiff has the burden to

show that

there

are no genuine issues

of material

fact,

as

to

each claim, when viewing the evidence in light most favorable to
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.,

the defendants.

780

P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613
(Utah 1982).

As the court is aware, summary judgment is not to

be used to determine what the facts are, but only whether there
are any material issues of fact in dispute.

Hill ex. rel« Foael

v. Grand Cent., Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970) (the court cannot
consider weight

of testimony

summary judgment);

or credibility

of witnesses on

Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978)

(the sole inquiry on summary judgment is whether there is a

material issue of fact to be decided);

Spor v. Crested Butte

Silver Mining. Inc. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987).
In this case there are clearly issues of material fact
relating to the claims asserted in defendants9
precluding summary judgment.
issues

of

Plaintiff concedes that there are

fact, but contends that these factual issues are

immaterial.
issues

Counterclaim,

of

(Plaintiff's Memorandum page 3)
fact

are

clearly

material

to

However, these
the

defendants'

Counterclaim.
A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of
the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth.
689

(N.D. 111. 1985).

Daniels v. Powell, 604 F.Supp

In general for tort claims, as those

asserted in defendants' Counterclaim, factual issues exist and
are

material

inappropriate.
Cir. 1979)

to

the

resolution

making

summary

judgment

Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21 (8th

As set forth herein, there are genuine issues of

material fact relating to defendants' Counterclaim; therefore,
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DISPUTE:
1.

Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 3. Troy

did not own the four greenhouses on the property.

The whole

eight acres, including the improvements, four greenhouses, was
leased from Boyd Christensen.
2.

(Markell Depo., pages 34-35)

Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 5. Troy

never intended to borrow money to finance the construction of

additional greenhouses on the property leased from Christensen.
In fact Troy did not want any additional property, but wanted to
znaxe use or the

idle property they already owned.

(Kehl Depo.,

page 115, 157-166/ 195; Markell Depo., page 33-35, 38). Phe need
to finance the construction for both the greenhouses and property
purchase was a result of the actions of Christensen and the Bank.
(Kehl Depo., pages 193-194; 155-157, 164-166, 195; Markell Depo.,
pages

33-38).

When

Boyd

requested

that Troy

purchase the

property Troy did not think there was any possible way and that
the deal was dead.
that

consulted

(Markell Depo., pages 40-44)

with

and

It was the Bank

advised Troy to make the deal and

insisted that Troy could borrow the $325,000 to purchase the
Christensen property and make it work.

(Kehl Depo. pages 191-

194, Markell Depo. 33-38)
3.

Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 6.

Troy's response in the preceding paragraph.

See

The loan by Troy was

to be for $170,000. Furthermore, there was no change in plans by
Troy as Troy never intended or planned to borrow $325,000.
was

the

Bank

not

Troy

that

changed

(Markell Depo., pages 33-38)
disputes

the

Bank's

conclusory

the

It

loan to $325,000.

Furthermore, Troy objects and
statement that the Bank did

everything "in a routine and customary manner."

As set forth

herein, the Bank did everything but handle this situation in a
routine and customary fashion.
4.

In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 7,

the pro-formas for cost and income projection and construction
were based upon the loan of $170,000.

(Markell Depo., pages 197-

198; M.Kehl Depo., pages 33-38; 156-166).

Furthermore the pro-

formas indicated to the Bank the time restrictions placed on the
project.
5.

(Markell Depo., page 123).
In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 8,

each party knew that the loan was to be approved by the Small
Business Administration of the United States Government ("SBA")
and that the Bank would loan the funds immediately upon SBA
approval so that the necessary construction could commence on the
project as scheduled.
6.
No. 9.

(Markell Depo., pages 65-76)

Troy adamantly disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact
The Bank had committed to loan the funds to Troy upon SBA

approval and the Bank knew this.

(M.Kehl Depo.# page 202)

This

is evidenced by Lee Fife's Affidavit wherein he states that he
was hopeful the Bank would have money to loan when the SBA
approved the loan and that as soon as SBA approval was given the
Bank moved as quickly as it could to remedy the situation.

(Fife

Affidavit, paragraphs 14 & 15) The Bank knew it was committed to
loan

the

money

upon

SBA

approval.

Furthermore,

the Bank

continually represented to Troy that the funds would be available
upon SBA approval and at no time did the Bank tell or inform Troy
that

the

funds may

not

be

available

(Markell Depo., pages

34,39,49,52,53,59,61,66,67 and 69) although according to Fife's
own Affidavit the Bank knew there was a problem with the funds
being available approximately 30 days prior to SBA approval.
(Affidavit Lee Fife, para. 13).
7.
10,

In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No.

Troy continually informed State Bank of the need to obtain

the funds immediately

upon the approval of the SBA so that

construction could commence.
that

any delay

conditions

and

Troy continued to inform the Bank

in the funding would make miserable working
effect

the

planting

of

the

crop

and

thus

jeopardize the chances of the project overall. (Markell Depo.,
pages 65-76)
8.

In relation to plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 11,

verbal approval was received from the SBA in the first part of
August more than 30 days prior to the written approval.
Depo., pages 67-76)

(Markell

The Bank, however, continued to make Troy

wait unreasonably before disbursing the funds. (Markell Depo.,
pages 65-80)
9.

Troy does not dispute plaintiff's Statement of Fact No.

12, to the extent that the Bank did not loan the funds upon SBA
approval.

Troy further asserts that the Bank by this time had

committed to loan the money to Troy upon SBA approval and was
aware of Troy's reliance on the funds. (See paragraphs 6 & 7
above)
10.

Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 13.

Lee Fife in his own Affidavit states that the Bank's lending
ability became tight approximately 30 days prior to SBA approval
and the Bank did not know if it could loan the funds. (Fife
Affidavit, paragraph 13).

The Bank being aware of this, however,

failed tell Troy about the problem or that the funds may not be
available. (Markell Depo., page 81). In fact, the Bank assured
Troy that the funds would be available upon SBA approval. Troy,
therefore, unaware of the Bank's problems, reasonably relied on

the commitment of the Bank to have the funds to loan upon SBA
approval.

These issues regarding the Bank's failure to disclose

relevant information to Troy and Troy's reliance on the Bank's
commitment to have the loans available upon SBA approval, alone
raise material issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
11.

In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No.

14, the Bank by its own admission tried to remedy the situation
because it realized that it had a commitment to Troy to have the
funds available and loan the same to Troy upon SBA approval.
Troy disputes the Bank's assertion that the situation was totally
remedied or that the Bank moved quickly.

The Bank handed the

loan package, pre-approved, to Markell and told him to peddle it
in the street to the other banks to try and get the funds.
(Markell Depo., page 78)
12.

Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 15.

Under the facts and circumstances, Troy had been forced into by
the Bank and as a direct result of the Bank's wrongful actions
Troy had no choice but to complete the loan.

Troy was not aware

of the Bank's problem with having available funds until after the
SBA approval was obtained and therefore, Troy did not have a
reasonable opportunity to pursue other options.

Troy also had

incurred a great deal of expense relying on the necessary and
timely funding by the Bank and had no choice but to complete the
loan or suffer substantial losses and lose the project. (Kehl
Depo., pages 207-208)

Troy was placed in fear of not only losing

its deal with the Bank, but of sustaining substantial losses and
having to close its operations in Utah.

Troy was thus compelled

to complete the loan and sign the loan documents against its
ordinary free will.

In addition the Bank, being responsible for

the situation, continually consulted with Troy and would approach
Troy with new creative ideas to try and remedy the problems,
creating a special relationship with Troy.

The Bank was also in

a fiduciary relationship with Troy, as the Trustee on the Trust
Deeds issued to secure both the $325,000 and $60,000 loans. Troy
had no reasonable choice but to put its trust in the Bank to
remedy the situation.

Again, at a minimum, material issues of

fact are presented precluding summary judgment.
13.

Troy objects and disputes plaintiff's Statements of

Fact Nos. 16 & 17.

Troy objects to these statements because

plaintiff has failed to cite to the record.

Troy disputes these

statements as the record clearly indicates that Troy experienced
cash

flow

problems

from

disbursement from the Bank.
269)

the

start

because

of

the

late

(M.Kehl Depo., pages 246-291; 268-

It was the result of this delay that Troy needed to recover

the operating capital it had used to make up for the delay.
Again

the Bank tried to remedy the situation by loaning an

additional $60,000.

The Bank did this because it realized that

it was responsible for the problem.
paragraph 13)
so

in

filling

(Affidavit of Lee Fife,

However, this reason could not be given to the SBA
out

the

$60,000

different reasons for the money.

loan

application

Fife cited

(Markell Depo., page 105)

This is also consistent with plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 19
to the extent that the $60,000 loan was to resolve the problem
caused by the Bank's delay in the original funding.

14.

Troy disputes plaintifffs Statement of Pact No. 19, to

the extent it infers that the $60,000 loan resolved the damages
caused by the delay.

The $60,000 loan did not remedy the

situation and Troy continually told the Bank that the matter was
not resolved.

(M.Kehl Depo., pages 268-269, 380-381, 246-291).

Furthermore, the $60,000 loan was not properly disbursed. (See
Troy's Statement of Fact No, 16 below)
15.

To clarify plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 21, Troy

did experience some set backs in growing the tomatoes; however,
it was Troy's problems with the Bank and the Bank's continuing
commitments and then failure to follow through that finally
caused Troy to shut down its greenhouse operations in Utah. As a
result of the delays and Troy's problems with the Bank, Troy was
unable to compete in the tomato market. Again this is a material
question of fact precluding summary judgment.
ADDITIONAL FACTS:
16.

The loan by Troy was to be for $170,000 to build

greenhouses.

(M.Kehl Depo., page 159-160, 163)

Troy intended

to continue to lease the land from Christensens.

(M.Kehl Depo.,

page 166)

Troy didn't want more property but wanted to make use

of the idle property they already owned.

(Kehl Depo., page 115,

157^166, 195; Markell Depo., page 33-35, 38)
ataurt

construction

on the

greenhouses by

Troy wanted to

the end of July.

(Mai-kell Depo., pages 57-58)
17.

Then out of the blue, Boyd Christensen requested that

Troy purchase the land it was leasing for $150,000.
Depo., page 41)

(Markell

Troy did not believe that there was any way

possible for it to borrow the $325,000 necessary to build the
greenhouses and purchase the property and considered the deal as
over and dead.

(Markell Depo., pages 40-44, 161)

absolute impossibility•
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(Markell Depo. page 49)

The Bank then consulting with Troy in its financial

decisions, advised
insisted

It was an

that

to Troy to borrower the full amount and

Troy

could

borrow

the

$325,000

necessary

to

purchase the Christensen property and construct the greenhouses.
(Kehl Depo. pages 191-194, Markell Depo. 33-38, 51-53).
19.

Christensen was a customer of the Bank and knew people

at the Bank.

(Markell Depo., page 54)

Christensen was under

pressure from the Bank to sell the property to pay off the Bank.
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 187-192)

The Bank was enthusiastic about

Troy purchasing the Christensen property and moved quickly once
the decision to borrow the $325,000 and purchase the Christensen
property was made.

(M.Kehl Depo., page 191)

In consulting with

Troy the Bank was more concerned about its own position with
Christensen

than

Troys, otherwise, the Bank would not have

advised Troy to borrow $325,000 for the same purpose and same
collateral as the $170,000 loan.
20.

(M.Kehl Depo., page 192)

In May of 1985, the Bank committed to loan the money to

Troy pending SBA approval.

(M.Kehl Depo., pages 199 & 202).

After this time the Bank (Fife) became even more involved in the
financial planning and consulting of Troy.
Troy

became

more

of

obtaining

(M.Kehl Depo., page 202)

The involvement of

instructions

from

the Bank.

21.

Based upon the commitment from the Bank in May of 1985

to loan the money, Troy proceeded with appraisals and the other
steps necessary to complete the loan as instructed by the Bank.
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 199-202)
22.

Troy

continually

informed

the

Bank

of

the

time

limitations and the need to obtain the funds immediately upon SBA
approval so that construction could commence.

Troy continued to

inform the Bank that any delay would make miserable working
conditions

and

effect

the

planting

of

the

crop

and

thus

jeopardize the chances of the project overall. (Markell Depo.,
pages 65-76)
23.

In response

to Troy's expressed

concerns the Bank

continually represented to Troy that the funds would be available
upon SBA approval and at no time did the Bank tell or inform Troy
that the funds may not be available.

(Markell Depo., pages

34,39,49,52,53,59,61,66,67 and 69).
24.
funds

The Bank, however, knew there was a problem with the

being

approval.
25.

available

approximately

30

days

prior

to

SBA

(Affidavit Lee Fife, para. 13).
Even

after

SBA

approval

was

obtained

the

Bank,

continued to make Troy wait before disbursing the funds. (Markell
Depo., pages 65-80)

It was not until later that Troy discovered

from other sources that the Bank did not have the funds available
to loan to Troy upon SBA approval.

(Markell Depo., page 81;

Affidavit Lee Fife, paragraph 13)
26.

As

a

result

of

the Bank's delay

construction was

delayed as well as the planting of the tomato crop resulting in

cash flow problems. (Markell Depo., page 93-98; M.Kehl Depo.,
pages 246-291; 268-269)

Although the delay may seem minor it

created a wide variety of problemsr as far as construction,
planting, marketing and production.

(Markell Depo., page 195)

It was the result of this delay that Troy lost $60,000 and was
over budget causing the depletion of Troy's operating capital at
its East Troy, Wisconsin, facility* (M.Kehl Depo., page 267-275,
297; Markell Depo., page 104, 114)
27.

The Bank tried to remedy the situation by loaning an

additional $60,000. (M.Kehl Depo., pages 267-274; Markell Depo.,
page 104)

The Bank did this because it realized that it was

responsible for the problem.

(Affidavit of Lee Fife, paragraph

13; M.Kehl Depo., pages 286-287; Markell Depo., page 105).
28.

Troy's problems however, were not resolved with the

$60,000 loan.

For one thing, the $60,000 loan was not properly

disbursed to Troy.

Only $25,836.26 actually went to Troy while

the rest went back to the Bank.
to pay off the Bank.
29.

At least $20,000 went directly

(Markell Depo., page 156).

The Bank in order to remedy the situation after the

$60,000 loan continued to consult with Troy on the project.
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 283-292).

The Bank participated in Troy's

financial decisions and exercised inordinate lender control and
continued with atypical lending practices to try to remedy Troy's
situation, e.g. the Bank continued to come up with a number of
creative financing packages, that were anything but routine and
customary, to generate more cash.
infra)

(See Statements of Fact 30-32,

The Bank acted as Troy's principal financial advisor and

consultant.
30.

(M.Kehl Depo., page 300).
In

November

of

1988, again

to

help

remedy

the

situation, Lee Fife at the Bank consulted with Troy as a partner
and advisor (M.Kehl Depo., page 350) and put together a loan
package so that Troy could secure a low interest loan from the
Five County Association of Governments to purchase a delivery van
($21,000) and so Keith Kehl could borrow money ($49,000) to lease
the site.

(Markell Depo., page 166-167)

As a part of the loan

package Troy was required to pay $20,000 in equity which went
directly to pay off the Bank.
31.

There were also problems with this loan.

paid by Troy went directly to pay off the Bank.

The $20,000

Troy was not the

borrower, yet, Troy was listed as the borrower on the majority of
the loan documents.

It was also never intended that Keith and

Karen Sue Kehl would become liable on the previous SBA loans,
however, the Bank convinced both Keith and Karen Sue into signing
personally on the SBA loans.
32.

Other forms of creative financing provided by the Bank

included unsecured loans to the employees of Troy, who, with the
Bank's knowledge and approval, would loan the monies to Troy and
deposit the money in Troy's account at the Bank.

Such loans were

made to Markell and Donald Kehl. (Markell Depo., page 112, 134
and 137).
33.

The Bank by its actions was allowed to control the

situation and rather than let regulators know the situation,
(Markell Depo. page 134-137) the Bank continued to loan money to
Troy to pay off the Bank, (Markell Depo., page 156)

Thereby,

enhancing the Bank's position to the detriment of Troy*
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are genuine issues of material facts as set forth
above, precluding summary judgment on defendants1 counterclaims.
These factual issues are material to defendants' Counterclaims
and require a determination of issues by the trier of fact.
Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate and plaintiff's
motion should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,

A.

There

is

a

Sufficient

Writing

in

Regards

to

the

$325,000 Loan,
First of all, the Bank has now admitted that it did not have
the $325,000 to loan Troy upon SBA approval.
Fife, paragraph 15)

(Affidavit Lee

The facts show that there was a commitment

by the Bank to loan the funds upon SBA approval.

Although the

Bank can claim there was no such commitment, there is at a
minimum an issue of fact, making this determination inappropriate
for summary judgment.

However, regardless as to whether there

was a commitment or not it remains undisputed that the Bank
failed to loan the $325,000 upon SBA approval.
Furthermore, there is a sufficient writing for the $325,000
loan to fall within the six year provision of Section 78-12-23
U.C.A.

(1953 as amended).

The terms of the contract are set

forth in the -loan documents and this is sufficient to constitute
a writing in terms of Section 78-12-23. It is not necessary that
the exact term sought to be enforced be in writing, it can even

be oral, as long as it relates or grows out of a written
instrument.
1972).

Evans v. Pickett Bros, Farms, 499 P.2d 273 (Utah

Furthermore, issues of fact are present as to whether the

Bank properly funded the money to Troy and if Troy received the
disbursements.
complaint

in

limitations.

This is an affirmative defense to plaintiff's
this

case

not

subject

to

the

statutes

of

If the Bank can assert that the defendants are

liable under the loan documents, then the Bank should also liable
under the documents for any failure or breach on its part.
Furthermore, the parties entered

into a new promise or

acknowledgment of the debt with the subsequent $60,000 loan in
November of 1987 and again with a $49,000 loan in November of
1988. This takes the case out of the statute of limitations.
Attorney General v, Pomerov, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah); Cannavina v.
Poston, 124 P.2d 787 (Wash.)
B.

The

defendants'

Counterclaims

did

not

accrue

on

September 3, 1985,
The Bank can only contend that one incident of all the
claims asserted arose on September 3, 1985, and that is the delay
in funding the $325,000 loan. However, as set forth above, there
is a sufficient writing concerning the $325,000 loan.
Furthermore, as shown by the above facts, the Bank's actions
with Troy were continuing.

The delay in funding the $325,000 was

only the start of a continuing relationship with the Bank which
evolved into a deeper relationship which involved breaches of
contract,

economic

duress,

negligent

structuring

and

disbursement, control and self-dealing and breaches of good faith

and fair dealing, as alleged in the Counterclaim, all subsequent
to the loan in September of 1985.
For example, the Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was
to resolve the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the
$60,000 loan was not made until February 10, 1987.

And again in

November of 1988, the Bank made loans to the defendants and
materially changed the terms of the original loan documents.
These

loans

involved

misrepresentations,

economic

duress,

negligent structuring and disbursal, control and self-dealing, as
well as breaches of duties of good faith and fair dealing, as
alleged

in defendants' Counterclaim.

Therefore, defendants'

Counterclaims did not accrue on September 5, 1985, as the Bank
would like the court to believe, but went well into the four year
limitation period, at least as late as November of 1988.
II.

A.

DEFENDANTS' CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IS SUFFICIENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND PROOF; AND IS CERTAINLY
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DISMISSAL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The

Mutuality

of

Obligation

Requirement

has been

Satisfied in This Case.
The test of mutuality is to be applied, not as of the time
the promises are made, but as of the time when one or the other
is sought to be enforced.
S.Ct.

845, 45 L.Ed.

1183.

Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 21
Both parties in this case have

performed sufficiently to satisfy the mutuality of obligation
requirement.

The contract in dispute in this case is no longer

an executory bilateral contract based solely on mutual promises
as argued by plaintiff in its memorandum.

Both parties have

performed or attempted to perform under the contract and upon

such

performance

the

contract

becomes

clothed

with

consideration and cannot be void for want of mutuality.

valid

Rubin v.

Dairymen's League Co-op, Ass'n, 284 N.Y. 32, 29 N.E.2d 458, (even
when the obligation of a unilateral contract is suspended for
want of mutuality at its inception, upon performance by the
promisee a consideration arises which relates back to the making
of the promise and it becomes obligatory)•
Furthermore, an obligation may be implied from the facts in
order to show mutuality.

P.T. McDermott, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mortq.

Co., 232 N.Y. 336, 133 N.E. 909.

Accordingly, where one party

has fully performed a contract on his part even though he could
not originally have been compelled to do so, the other party
cannot avoid liability for his breach thereof on the grounds of
want of mutuality. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollock, 73
P.2d 427 (1937).

Therefore, although neither party may not have

been required to complete the loan at the initial stages both
parties attempted

performance and the Bank cannot now avoid

liability for breach on the grounds of want of mutuality.
B.

The Contract

Cannot Fail for Lack of Mutuality as

Consideration has been Given.
First of all "mutuality of obligation" is only a semantical
exercise

surrounding

namely, consideration.

the

real

determination

of

a contract,

Adalex Laboratories, Inc. v. Krawitz, 270

P.2d 346 (Okl. 1954); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing
Co.. 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1973).

Where there is consideration

for a contract there is no additional requirement of mutuality of
obligation.

Restatement, Contracts 2d Section 79(c).

As stated

above there has clearly been sufficient consideration given for
the contract in this case, therefore, the contract cannot fail
for mutuality of obligation.
The case of Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogard, 494 N.E.2d
965 (Ind.App. 1986), cited by plaintiff, is distinguishable from
this case on a number of very important points.

First, in Bogard

there was no attempt by the bank to extend Bogard's line of
credit.

The bank simply refused to deal with him.

however, the Bank did loan funds to Troy.
Bogard

had

renewed

Bogard* s

line

In this case,

Surely, if the bank in

of

credit,

but

did

so

negligently causing him to default on his payments the outcome
would

have been different.

Another important

difference in

Bogard is that the bank refused Bogard's offer for additional
security and so Bogard had an opportunity to attempt to find
financing elsewhere.

In this case, the Bank never refused Troy,

but to the contrary, encouraged Troy and urged Troy on, telling
Troy that the money would be available.

The Bank never informed

Troy that the funds may not be available.

In fact, the Bank knew

it was committed to loan the funds and was hopeful it could loan
the funds on SBA approval.

It was only after the SBA approval

and the Bank didn't have the money that Troy was informed of the
problem by confronting the Bank after being informed by third
parties•
C.

The Contract is not too Indefinite to be Enforced.

Plaintiff
because

the

contends that the contract
timing

of

the

disbursement

(Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 13 & 17).

is not enforceable
is

too

indefinite.

The rejection of a

contract for indefiniteness is, at best, a last resort•
Realty Corp, v. Karanas, 131 H.E.2d 579

Wedtke

(N.Y.App.Div. 1953)

The courts favor carrying out the intentions of the parties
by enforcing contracts and disfavor holding them unenforceable
because of uncertainty.
validity

As such, the defense of uncertainty has

only when the uncertainty or incompleteness

of the

contract prevents a court from knowing what to enforce.

Okun v.

Morton, 203 Cal. Rptr. 220, 1977).

In this case, it is clear

that the funding was to be made available upon SBA approval.
This is also substantiated by the Bank's own submitted Affidavit
wherein, Fife states that the Bank was to loan the funds upon SBA
approval and that Fife hoped that the loans would be available.
(Lee Fife Affidavit, paragraph 14)
Furthermore, where there is an absence as to an express
provision in a contract that term can be implied if warranted
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
v.

First

Nat.

Bank.

590

P.2d

826

(Wyo.

1979).

Engle

See also

Restatement, Contracts 2d, Section 204. Based upon the facts and
circumstances in this case, it can be reasonably inferred that
the funds were to be disbursed upon SBA approval.

The testimony

of Lee Fife, that the Bank planned to loan the funds and hoped
the funds would be available upon SBA approval, and that the Bank
afterwards tried to remedy the problem as quickly as it could,
shows that the disbursement upon SBA approval was contemplated by
the parties, and, at a minimum, raises issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment.

Price Enterprises, Inc. v. Griffith

Oil Co., Inc., 664 P.2d 877 (Kan.App. 1983) (intention of parties

in entering into a contract is a question of fact)•
III. DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF ECONOMIC DURESS CANNOT
BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
All the elements necessary for economic duress are present
in this case: (1) wrongful acts by the Bank (2) which put Troy in
fear and (3) compelled Troy to do something against its will.
Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).
Duress exists whenever one, by an unlawful act of another is
induced to perform some act under circumstances which deprives
him of the exercise of free will.

In re Adoption of Min, 652

0.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982).
A.

The Bank's acts were Wrongful.

As set forth in the above facts, the Bank failed to properly
disburse the funding for the $325,000 loan upon SBA approval as
committed.

This constitutes a breach of a commitment to fund and

is a wrongful act by the Bank.

This alone distinguishes this

case from the facts of Heglar Ranch were there was no wrongful
act committed by the bank.

Jd. at 1391.

Furthermore, the Bank knew that it had failed to properly
disburse the funds as committed and solicited subsequent loans to
Troy in order to remedy the situation.

The Bank, however, also

failed to properly disburse the subsequent loans.

To say that

there is no allegation that the acts of the Bank were wrongful is
simply not correct.

At a minimum issues of material fact are

present regarding the Bank's wrongful actions.
B.

Trov was Compelled to Act Against its Will.

Troy could not simply walk away from this transaction like
Stillman in Healar Ranch and be only out of the benefit of the

bargain.

Troy had substantial money invested in the operation,

relying on the Bank's commitment and if Troy walked away the
whole project would have been lost.

Business compulsion is a

form of economic duress, where one is compelled to act in such a
manner or suffer a serious business loss. Nord v. Eastside Ass'n
Ltd..

664

P.2d

4

(Wash.App.

1983);

Barker v. Walter Hoaan

Enterprises, Inc.. 569 P.2d 1359 (Wash.App. 1979).
Furthermore, unlike Heglar Ranch, the Bank in this case
caused the underlying circumstances depriving Troy of its free
will, making the Bank liable for the economic duress.
T.R. . 777 P.2d 1106

(Wyo. 1986).

Matter of

Moreover, the question of

whether there is economic duress is a question of fact for the
jury, not for summary judgment.

Royal v. Morris. 669 P.2d 1100

(N.M.App. 1983).
IV.

DEFENDANTS' CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CANNOT
BE DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

There were promises made to Troy, as set forth above in the
facts, concerning the funding of the loan and Troy reasonably
relied on those promise to its detriment.

Assuming arguendo that

there is no binding loan commitment, liability still arises for
promises made by the bank if the lender reasonably acts to its
detriment in reliance upon such promises, under the doctrine of
promissory

estoppel.

Restatement

2d Contracts Section 90(11

(1981) . See also Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
The case of Security Bank and Trust Company v. Bogard, 494
N.E.2d 965 (Ind.App. 1986), cited by the Bank, is not on point in
this case.

In Bogard the bank totally refused to deal with

Bogard and flat out refused to loan him any money, thus, Bogard

went else where looking for financing • In this case the Bank did
deal with Troy and in fact encouraged and urged Troy to loan the
money and continually promised Troy that the funds would be
available•
The facts in this case are more in line with
White, supra.

Wheeler v,

In Wheeler the court found a claim for promissory

estoppel, although there was no binding commitment to lend, where
the lender sustained damages in reliance upon White's promise
that the loan would be forthcoming for his construction.

See

also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d. 267 (Wis.
1965).

In this case, the Bank promised the loan would be forth

coming and Troy reasonably relied on the Bank's promises to its
detriment.

In fact the Bank realized that Troy was relying on

its promises and was therefore hopeful that the money would be
available to lend upon SBA approval, although not disclosing this
concern with Troy.
V.

THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT.

A.

The Bank owed a Duty to Troy to Process the Loan, etc.

in a Competent Manner.
With every contract is a common law duty to perform with
care, skill, reasonable expenditures and faithfulness, the thing
agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of
these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract.
Montgomery Ward and Company v. Schanenbech, 206 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.
1947) •

In this case the Bank owed a duty to Troy to see that the

funds would be available upon SBA approval as committed.

B.

The Bank by its Actions Breached its Duty to Troy.

It is undisputed in this case that the Bank did not have the
funds to disburse to Troy upon SBA approval and thus the Bank
breached its duty to Troy.

Also, as set forth above, after the

$325,000 loan, the Bank continued to make promises to Troy which
it breached or failed to follow through on.
issues

of

fact

are

presented

here, making

Again at a minimum
summary

judgment

totally inappropriate. Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21
(8th Cir. 1979)
C.

Trov was Damaged as a Direct Result of the Bank's

Actions.
The facts also clearly show that Troy was damaged as a
result of the Bank's actions. The construction was started late,
the crop was planted late, etc.

Even the Bank admits that it

made an additional loan of $60,000 to try and solve the problem.
There can be no question but that Troy was damaged as a result of
the Bank's actions.

The question as far as the extent or amount

of damages is of course a question of fact for the jury, and is
not for summary judgment.
VI.

THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF CONTROL AND SELF DEALING
IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A.

A

Special

or

Fiduciary

Relationship

was

Developed

Between the Bank and the Defendants.
Although a lender is generally not in a fiduciary position,
facts and circumstances often arise which create a fiduciary
relationship.

A fiduciary relationship does arise when the banks

become financial advisors.

This is particularly true when there

has

been

a

relationship

established

for

a period

of time,

justifying the customer's reliance on the Bank to act in his best
interest*

Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz.

1937); Deist v. Wachholz. 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984).
instant

case, Troy

interest.

relied

on the Bank to

act

In the

in its best

The Bank had failed to properly disburse funds to Troy

and the Bank was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on how to
generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate the
problems.
The Bank is also a fiduciary to Troy pursuant to statute, as
the trustee on the deeds of trust securing the loans in this
case.

Section 22-1-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated

amended).

(1953 as

The Bank clearly violated its fiduciary trust to Troy

by its actions as alleged above.

The Bank was not acting in

Troy's best interest in its dealings with Troy, but in the best
interest of Christensen, who was a customer of the Bank, and/or
in its own best interest, to see that Christensen's obligations
to the Bank were paid by loaning additional money to Troy.
The Bank also exercised control over the defendants, which
is sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary relationship.

A.G.

Jensen Farms Co. v. Carcrill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
Although Fife may not have attended Troy's board meetings or
shareholders' meetings, the Bank's control and dominance over
Troy was so substantial that Troy's operations and affairs in
Utah rest totally in control of the Bank.

Troy is a family run

business and although Michael Kehl may have made the decisions he
relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise.

This is

especially true when Troy ran into problems as a result of the
Bank's failure to fund the initial loan.

Troy had no choice but

to lose the operation or rely on the Bank's creative financing
ideas to remedy the situation.

Certainly there is a question of

fact present as to whether the Bank's actions as an advisor and
partner rises to a fiduciary duty in this case.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself
first from the proceeds of the loans, contrary to what was
represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to Troy.

It

is also admitted that the Bank knew of its financial problems and
that it may not have the money to lend, yet failed to disclose
this to Troy.
Bank's

self

This alone raises issues of fact concerning the
dealing

and whether an inadvertent

partnership existed with Troy.
634 (Pa. 1967).

or informal

Rosenberger v. Herbert, 232 A.2d

A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith

and scrupulous honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to
made

good

faith

transaction."

disclosures

of

all

facts

relevant

to the

Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App.

1985); Meyers v. Moodv, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).
Bank

clearly

breached

its

duty

to

disclose

all

The

relevant

information to the defendants in this case and Troy's claim for
control and self dealing cannot be dismissed on summary judgment.
VII. THE BANK BREACHED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING WITH THE DEFENDANTS.
As stated above, a special relationship existed between the
Bank and Troy, therefore, a duty of good faith and fair dealing
is imposed on the Bank, including a duty to disclose all relevant
information.

Kirbv v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App.

1985); Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).
This duty was breached by the Bank.
Furthermore,

additional

facts are present

in this case

invoking the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of
good

faith and fair dealing,

Wallis v. Superior Court, 207

Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984).

For one, the

parties were in inherently unequal bargaining positions. This is
particularly true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial
funds, which put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and
subject

to the Bank's control.

vulnerable

because

Second, Troy was especially

of the harm it would

suffer if the Bank

refused to remedy the situation and as a result had to place
great trust in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was
aware of Troy's vulnerability.

All of these factors are relevant

issues concerning the Bank's fiduciary duty to the defendants and
the breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing with the
defendants, therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
this claim should be denied.

Wallis v. Superior Court, 207

Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.> Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984)

CONCLUSION
There are genuine issues of material fact concerning the
defendants' Counterclaims in this matter.

Therefore, plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to dismissal all of
the counterclaims should be dismissed.

DATED this

"/

day of April, 1992.
BROWN & BROWN

-*=Budge W.' Call

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the "ffi» day of April, 1992,
I caused to be overnight delivered , a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum to:
Thomas M. Higbee
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O.Box 726
Cedar City, UT 84720
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